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This article addresses the issue of the legal nature of the bankruptcy estate:
whether the bankruptcy estate is a collection of property interests, like the
traditional conception of a decedent's estate, 1 or whether the estate is the
legal person in which such property interests vest, analogous to a corporation,
a partnership, or an individual. The legal nature of the bankruptcy estate
becomes most important when a corporation which files a chapter 11 petition
becomes a debtor in possession. Suppose Acme Corporation files a chapter 11
bankruptcy petition and becomes a debtor in possession; Acme's property becomes
the bankruptcy estate. What is Acme Corporation's current relationship to its
property? Under what I will call the "property view," 2 that property remains
vested in Acme Corporation, a corporation in bankruptcy, with Acme subject to
new rights and obligations as a debtor in possession. Under what I will call the
"new person view," the commencement of the bankruptcy case (1) creates a new
legal person, the Acme Estate, (2) causes Acme Corporation's property to be
transferred from Acme Corporation to the Acme Estate, and (3) places Acme
Corporation, the debtor in possession, as representative of the Acme Estate.
The new person view is actually a new variant of a rather metaphysical legal
doctrine, the "new entity" view. 3 Under that view, when Acme Corporation goes
into bankruptcy, the filing does not create a new legal person in the form of
Acme Estate. Rather, as under the property view, the property of the estate
remains vested in Acme Corporation. Acme
[*466] Corporation itself, however, is considered a new legal person. That is,
the pre-bankruptcy legal person that was Acme Corporation no longer exists, but
is instantly reincarnated in the form of Acme Corporation, debtor in possession.
Although Acme Corporation, debtor in possession, has exactly the same officers,
directors, and by-laws as the old Acme Corporation, it is considered a new and
distinct legal entity, not subject to the obligations of the old Acme
Corporation. This type of analysis makes it easy to answer many questions
regarding the debtor in possession's rights and obligations during bankruptcy.
The new entity view, however, became questionable after the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco. 4 Bildisco & Bildisco, a general
partnership that was party to a collective bargaining agreement, had filed for
bankruptcy. Bildisco & Bildisco, now debtor in possession, argued that it was a
new legal entity with no responsibilities under a collective bargaining
agreement signed by the old Bildisco & Bildisco. 5 The Court rejected this view,
holding that, at least for the purpose of the labor laws, the debtor and the
debtor in possession were the same entity. 6
Despite the holding in Bildisco, confusion remained
the new entity theory, and some courts continued to
debtor in possession are separate legal entities. 7
applicability of Bildisco 8 or regarded Bildisco as

regarding the viability of
hold that the debtor and the
Courts either ignored the
addressing [*467] the

issue narrowly. 9 In addition, other courts acknowledged that under Bildisco the
debtor and the debtor in possession are the same entity, but nevertheless held
that they are also different. 10 The court in Mohawk Industries v. United States
(In re Mohawk Industries) 11 held that the debtor was "sufficiently distinct
from its former self" 12 such that it is now a different entity for the purposes
of set off rights. Other courts have written that a debtor is "to some extent a
new entity," 13 or that there is "a definite cleavage which separates the two
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition." 14 These court decisions provide a
rather vague and unsatisfactory basis for the bankruptcy law analysis. 15
[*468]
The new person view developed as an attempt to provide a clearer basis for
retaining the effects, if not the form, of the new entity view. The new person
view recognizes that the debtor in possession is the same entity as the debtor,
as Bildisco indicates. But the new person view sees the debtor in possession as
simply acting on behalf of a new legal person in which the property of the
bankruptcy estate vests. As such, the debtor in possession is itself not a new
entity, but it acts on behalf of a new entity. Moreover, all the property of the
old entity transfers to the new entity. Instead of the debtor in possession
becoming a new entity distinct from the debtor, the debtor in possession becomes
the representative of a new entity that possesses all the debtor's property.
Such a view can reach the same results as the new entity view, while arguably
not conflicting with Bildisco. 16
The legal nature of the bankruptcy estate is not an idle question of juridical
taxonomy. Nor do I intend to analyze the issue simply by attempting to decide
which of the legal forms seems a closer fit. Rather, the choice of approach
significantly affects how one would analyze many questions that might arise in
the Acme bankruptcy. It is with reference to
[*469] the effect on such analysis that I will concentrate. The Bankruptcy
Code 17 addresses many issues about the rights and obligations of persons both
corporal and corporate who have an interest in the Acme bankruptcy, but it also
leaves open a number of issues. If Acme Corporation was party to several
contracts, is Acme Corporation still a party to the contracts or is Acme Estate?
If the debtor in possession exercises the power of a trustee to reject one of
the contracts, does the contract terminate or does it revert to Acme
Corporation? Can the debtor in possession, or a trustee, if one is appointed,
exercise Acme's corporate powers, such as the power to waive Acme's
attorney-client privilege about pre-bankruptcy communications or the power of
Acme's corporate officers to perform acts within their powers? What are the
fiduciary duties of the officers and directors of Acme Corporation and to whom
do they run? Corporate governance issues may also arise; can the shareholders of
Acme hold an election of directors? Each of these questions is cast in a
different light, depending on whether we follow the property view and regard
Acme Corporation as remaining in possession of its property, although subject to
new rights and obligations in dealing with that property, or if we follow the
new person view and regard Acme Corporation as acting on behalf of a new legal
person, the Acme Estate, to which Acme Corporation's property is transferred.
The issue of the legal nature of the bankruptcy estate arises primarily to fill
two types of gaps: where the Code has not spoken specifically or is susceptible
to more than one interpretation, and where nonbankruptcy issues are addressed in
bankruptcy court. Issues like those discussed in the previous paragraph fall
into both categories. The new person view and the property view lead to a
difference in the basic approach to filling these gaps.
The new person view provides an apparently short, clearcut answer

[*470] to certain legal questions; the estate is a new legal person distinct
from the debtor, so it is neither bound nor directly affected by the rights and
obligations of the debtor. Such is the easy solution the new person view reaches
on questions involving the debtor's contracts, corporate powers, or corporate
governance. Some courts have often used the new entity or new person view as
such a short-cut, while the better approach would be to confront directly the
application of the specific relevant bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law. 18 The
potential for manipulation alone is a reason to reject the new person view. 19
In this article, however, I will address the more sophisticated uses of the new
person view, which use it not just as a shortcut, but rather as a basis for
developed analyses of legal doctrine in areas like executory contracts and
corporate governance, and even for an overall theory of bankruptcy law. I will
argue that the new person view introduces disruptive complications into
bankruptcy analysis and tends to distort the rights and obligations of both the
debtor and those with an interest in the debtor, such as creditors,
shareholders, and contracting parties. The new person view, if fully developed,
ends the analysis of many issues in bankruptcy
[*471] law very quickly, when often a more detailed interpretation of the
relevant Code provision or other rule is necessary. 20
Part I examines relevant provisions of the Code and the tax laws, and concludes
that the statutory support for the new person view is, at best, ambiguous. Some
provisions in the Code may seem to support the new person view if read
individually, but when read in context, they do not. Furthermore, other Code
provisions invalidate use of the new person theory as well. Moreover, the new
person view would render some parts of the Code redundant. The tax laws also
prove more consistent with the property view than the new person view.
Part II discusses executory contracts, the area of bankruptcy law in which the
new person view, and its predecessor, the new entity view, developed. 21
Although the new entity view at one time arguably supplied a necessary rationale
for the executory contract doctrine, it is no longer necessary. Rather than
supplying a basis for analysis, it now introduces a number of unnecessary and
unhelpful complications into the analysis.
Part III examines the effects of the new person view on analysis of corporate
governance issues and the appropriate use of the corporate powers of the debtor
during bankruptcy. The new person view creates an unnecessary division between
the debtor and the debtor's property, distorting the rights and obligations of
both the debtor and those with an interest in the debtor. The bankruptcy process
affects the entire corporation, not just its property. Because the new person
view simply creates a new legal person to take over the debtor's property, it
fails to account for this occurrence. Effective reorganization or liquidation of
the debtor will implicate not only its property, but also the corporate
structure, powers, and governance.
Part IV turns from doctrinal analysis to legal theory and discusses
[*472] whether the new person view is necessary for a noneconomic theory of
bankruptcy. The leading theory of bankruptcy is based on an economic model, and
is consistent with the property view. The leading noneconomic theory of
bankruptcy relies in part on the new person view. I will argue, however, that
the new person view is not a necessary part of the noneconomic theory, and that
such a theory could be broader in scope if it used the property approach.

I. STATUTORY AUTHORITY

There are two types of statutory provisions most pertinent to the legal nature
of the bankruptcy estate. First, although the Code does not address the legal
nature of the estate directly, it includes several provisions that spell out
basic characteristics of the estate and the trustee or the debtor in possession.
22 Second, a number of statutory provisions govern the tax consequences of a
bankruptcy filing and the various events that may occur during the bankruptcy;
many of the provisions appear in the Code itself, 23 and others which appear in
the Internal Revenue Code, 24 were passed with bankruptcy specifically in mind.
25 Tax law regularly deals with the type of questions at issue when deciding the
legal nature of an entity, specifically, are entities separate and what sort of
legal entities are they? 26 As a result, the tax provisions are quite
illuminating on the issue.

A. Bankruptcy Code Provisions

The new person view would require reading too deeply into a few provisions of
the Code and dismissing some other provisions. The Bankruptcy Act, 27
predecessor to the Code, treated the bankruptcy estate as a collection of
property interests. 28 Commencement of a bankruptcy did not create an estate as
a new and separate legal person; rather, the debtor's property which constituted
the bankruptcy estate vested in the bankruptcy
[*473] trustee. 29 If the debtor remained in possession, the property of the
bankruptcy estate was vested in the debtor, although the debtor now held such
property subject to the limits in the Act and the control of the court. 30
The commencement of a case under the Code creates an estate comprised of certain
property interests. 31 Under the property view, the Code would keep the same
basic approach as the Bankruptcy Act, perhaps even a simpler one. If the debtor
remains in possession, whether a corporation or an individual, the property
remains vested in the debtor. If a trustee is appointed in a corporate
bankruptcy, the property remains vested in the debtor corporation, and the
trustee largely displaces the officers and directors of the debtor. Only in an
individual bankruptcy where a trustee is appointed will the debtor be divested
of the estate property, which vests in the trustee.
According to the new person view, the Code creates another legal person, namely
an estate encompassing the property interests formerly of the debtor and
becoming the legal person in which such property interests vest. The
commencement of the bankruptcy case would divest the debtor of its property, but
would not vest that property in the trustee, as it did under the Bankruptcy Act.
Rather, the property would vest in the estate itself. "Property of the estate,"
a phrase which appears throughout the Code, 32 would then refer not only to such
property as making up the estate, but also as being vested in the estate as a
legal person. When the debtor remains in possession, the debtor's property is
not vested in the debtor. Instead, the debtor in possession acts as an agent for
the newly created person: the estate.
Such a structure is not spelled out in the Code; rather, it would have
[*474] to be inferred from several sections of the Code. 33 The statutory
argument for the new person view runs along the following lines: Section 541
provides that the commencement of a bankruptcy case "creates an estate." 34
Section 323 provides that the trustee is "the representative of the estate." 35
Thus, the trustee, rather than being the person in whom the property of the

estate vests, now is simply the representative of the estate; that is, an agent
of the estate similar to an officer of a corporation. 36 Similarly, if the
debtor remains in possession, the estate property would not remain vested in the
debtor, but rather the debtor would act as the representative of the estate,
which is an entirely separate legal entity. 37 Accordingly, the debtor's
relationship to the estate is that of transferor and transferee. 38
Read in isolation, such provisions seem consistent with the new person view. But
a number of difficulties arise if the provisions are read in light of the Code
as a whole and according to the construction of such terms under the Bankruptcy
Act. Such a reading would support an interpretation requiring far less a change
in bankruptcy law than the extravagant reading required by the new person view.
For example, section 541, which states that commencement of the case creates an
estate, further provides that the "estate is comprised of all the following
property . . .," 39 making the estate simply a collection of property interests.
It also highlights the fact that neither section 541 nor any other Code section
provides that the commencement of the case either divests the debtor of property
or vests the property in the estate. The Code, however, does continue the use of
the Bankruptcy Act term, "debtor in possession," which the Code concisely
[*475] defines as "the debtor." 40 This implies continuation of the approach
taken by the Bankruptcy Act, under which the property that constituted the
estate was vested in the debtor as debtor in possession. 41 Thus, the debtor in
possession is simply the debtor, still in possession of its prebankruptcy
property, but now vested with the rights and duties of the trustee.
Similarly, the trustee's status as "representative of the estate" 42 is subject
to a more modest reading than inferring that the Code departs from the structure
under the Bankruptcy Act making the trustee an agent of the estate. Rather, the
term could be used to refer to the executor or administrator of a decedent's
estate. 43 Indeed, courts, including the Supreme Court, on occasion have
referred to a bankruptcy trustee as the "representative of the estate," long
before the Code was enacted. 44 This again indicates that no great innovation
appears in the Code.
The definitions in the Code also differentiate an estate from a legal person.
The definition of "person" includes individuals, partnerships, and corporations.
45 The broader definition of "entity" includes persons, estates, and trusts. 46
Thus, the Code's definition of "person" includes the sort of legal entities that
are usually viewed as persons but not the sort of entities that usually consist
simply of property interests. 47 Thus, a bankruptcy estate, like a decedent's
estate, is simply a collection of property interests.
The new person view seeks further support in the provisions that a dismissal of
the case "revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such
property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case" 48 and that
confirmation "vests all the property of the estate in the debtor." 49 The
argument is that such provisions would be unnecessary
[*476] if the property were not vested in the estate rather than the debtor.
Such a view has three problems. First, the provision vesting the property of the
estate upon confirmation serves to give effect to section 1123(a)(5)(A), which
states that a plan may provide for "retention by the debtor of all or any part
of the property of the estate." 50 If the property interests had been
transferred to the estate, then the debtor would have nothing to retain; rather,
a transfer back to the debtor would be required. Second, the provisions seem
more likely to reflect the view that the estate property, although vested in the
debtor, is vested in the debtor as debtor in possession. Under such a view,
which existed under the Bankruptcy Act, 51 if the case is dismissed or a plan of

reorganization confirmed, then the estate property revested in the debtor in the
debtor's own right. 52
Finally, even if the provisions are interpreted to mean that the property of the
estate was not vested in the debtor during the bankruptcy, this would not mean
that they were vested in the estate. Rather, the drafters of those particular
provisions were more likely operating under the prevailing view of the
Bankruptcy Act that the property of the estate vested in the trustee or remained
vested in the debtor in possession if no trustee were appointed. 53
Furthermore, if one adopts the new person view, the language in section 553 of
the Code, 54 designed to separate particular pre-petition and post-petition
property rights, would be redundant. Section 553 limits setoff rights to those
that arose before the petition was filed. A basic requirement of set-off is
mutuality. One can only set off obligations to a person if one has enforceable
rights against the same person. 55 If A owes me money, I can set that debt off
against my debt to A, but I cannot use that as a reason not to pay my debt to B.
If the estate and the debtor were separate legal persons, there would be no
mutuality and thus no question of setting off post-petition rights. A creditor
could not set off obligations of the debtor against property of the estate in
the hands of the creditor. 56
[*477] Thus, the limitation in section 553 to pre-petition debts would be
nugatory. 57
The drafting and enactment of the Code was a hurried and slightly disorganized
process which resulted in ambiguities, redundancies, and inconsistencies in the
statute. 58 It is not surprising, then, that the statute does not clearly define
the legal nature of the bankruptcy estate. Indeed, legislative history can be
used to support either view. 59 The new person view, however, represents a
radical change in the structure of bankruptcy
[*478] law. Thus, its acceptance should require more than an ambiguous, rather
strained interpretation of the Code. More important, such equivocal statutory
support should not overcome the doctrinal and theoretical weakness of the
approach. 60

B. Bankruptcy Tax Provisions

The statutory provisions governing the taxation aspects of bankruptcy cases are
instructive on the nature of the bankruptcy estate. The question of whether the
estate is a new legal person to whom the property of the debtor is transferred
reflects two basic issues of tax law: the characterization of legal entities and
the determination of whether a taxable disposition of property has occurred. 61
If the commencement of a corporate bankruptcy created a new legal person and
transferred the corporation's property to the new legal person, normal corporate
taxation rules would impose a number of consequences. 62 The new entity would
begin existence as a separate taxable entity. The transfer of the property would
be a disposition of the property, which would trigger realization of gains or
losses, unless the disposition fit into specific nonrealization provisions. 63
The corporation would determine whether it had a taxable gain or loss with
respect to each piece of property by subtracting its basis in the property from
what it received for the property. 64 When the estate itself disposed of the
property, then its gains or losses would similarly depend on its basis and the
amount it received in exchange for the property. 65

If the corporation and the estate were treated as separate entities, as the new
person view dictates, then the tax attributes of the corporation would be
separate from the tax attributes of the estate. A corporation may have
accumulated net losses, capital gains losses, or tax credits from previous
[*479] years which it may use to offset its present tax liability. 66 While the
corporation could not transfer these favorable tax attributes to another
corporation, they do get transferred from the debtor corporation to the
corporation after reorganization. 67
Another tax consequence occurring as a result of the new person theory is the
realization of income by the creditors and shareholders upon transfer of the
property from the corporation to the estate. Take as an example a creditor
holding a bond issued by the corporation. Upon the commencement of the
bankruptcy, this creditor would still have the bond, but the corporation would
no longer have any assets because all of its property was transferred to the
estate. The creditor, however, may now also have a claim, with some possible
value, against the newly created person, the estate. 68 A shareholder of a
debtor corporation would be in a similar situation. The shareholders would hold
a potentially fruitful property interest because of the possibility that the
corporation could be successfully reorganized, enhancing the value of their
interests. Thus, the creditor and shareholder would have effectively disposed of
their bond and stock in exchange for a claim and an interest, a potential
realization event resulting in taxable gain or loss. Therein lies the further
inconsistency of the new person theory: under the current tax system, a
bankruptcy does not trigger the realization of losses or gains by the creditors
or shareholders, nor does it trigger the realization of losses or gains from the
disposition of the property of the corporation. 69
Clearly, these tax laws do not treat the estate as separate from the
pre-bankruptcy corporation, nor do they treat the estate as a successor to, or
transferee of, the pre-bankruptcy corporation. In addition to the bankruptcy not
triggering any taxable gains or losses, it also does not create a separate
taxable entity, leaving the tax attributes of the corporation unaffected. 70 The
corporation remains the same legal entity as before, only now in bankruptcy. 71
Under the new person theory, the lack of tax consequences might be explained by
deeming the estate the successor of the corporation, thereby
[*480] stepping into the corporation's shoes for tax purposes. This
explanation, however, ignores the legal existence of the debtor. Once bankruptcy
begins under the new person view, there are two entities - the debtor and the
estate. Since the debtor would maintain a separate legal existence from the
estate, there would be two taxable entities. In reality, however, there can only
be one taxable entity. The estate could not possibly step into the shoes of the
debtor as its successor because the debtor is still wearing them. Furthermore, a
predecessor's tax attributes does not automatically pass to its successor. 72
For example, if Corporation A's property passes to Corporation B, then this
would trigger the realization of gains and losses by A on the disposition of its
property, and set B's basis in the property for determining the consequences of
any dispositions by B in the future. 73 Such a transfer of assets, however,
would not allow B to succeed to A's tax attributes. 74
The most notable exception to this, where the successor does inherit the tax
attributes of its predecessor, is when the property passes as part of a tax-free
reorganization. 75 Corporate tax laws provide that where property passes from
one corporation to its successor, there will be no tax consequences if the form
of the transaction falls into one of the categories of tax-free reorganizations.
76 Tax laws appear to recognize a change in the legal status of a corporation,

not upon the commencement of bankruptcy as mandated by the new person theory,
but rather only if the bankruptcy concludes with a reorganization of the
corporation that changes or shifts the financial structure, property, or
ownership of the corporation. 77 The recognition of a change in the legal status
of the corporation is not triggered simply by the fact that the corporation
filed for bankruptcy, but by the actual changes made in the corporate structure
of the debtor during reorganization. 78 Thus, the tax laws recognize that
bankruptcy may transfer the debtor's property to a successor without tax
consequences only if there are actual changes in the debtor or its property
during the course of the bankruptcy. This sort of transfer does not occur
automatically at the commencement of every case, as the new person view would
indicate.
[*481]
The new person view further indicates that the commencement of bankruptcy not
only transfers the ownership of the debtor's property, but also changes the
ownership of the debtor. According to this view, the creditors become the owners
of the new entity created by the transfer of property. 79 If a corporation has
more losses than income in a given year, however, it can carry over the excess
losses and set them off against future income, reducing its tax liability. 80
Thus, if a corporation has net operating losses from past years that it has not
yet reduced to income, the net operating losses are in effect a present asset.
81 This presents a temptation to manipulate corporate forms in order to shift
losses so that they can be used to offset the gains of another corporation. For
example, suppose that Corporation A operates a money losing business making
widgets and has accumulated a store of net operating losses. Suppose also that
Corporation B operates a profitable ratchet making business. If the two
corporations merged into Corporation A, then A's past losses could be used to
reduce the tax liability on profits from the ratchet business.
To guard against such manipulation, the Tax Code limits the total amount of net
operating losses one may carry over in any one year upon a change of ownership
of a corporation. 82 Suppose, for example, Corporation A has net operating
losses, and its sole shareholder X sells all the stock of Corporation A to Y. 83
Corporation A's ability to use those net operating losses to reduce future
taxable income will now be subject to limitations designed to prevent Y from
using Corporation A to shelter income from a source other than Corporation A's
previous business. 84 The statute explicitly requires the corporation to
continue its previous business enterprise for two years in order to retain the
ability to carry forward net
[*482] operating losses. 85 Again, these tests may be applied during the
course of a bankruptcy reorganization, except not at the commencement of the
case, as would be the result if adhering to the new person view, but rather upon
the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 86 Thus, the net operating loss
provisions of the Tax Code also view bankruptcy in a way consistent with the
property view and contrary to the new person view.
In short, the corporate tax laws do not treat the estate as a new legal person,
but rather view the debtor corporation as the same entity that existed before
the petition, focusing on what happens to the debtor during the bankruptcy to
determine if there are tax consequences. This approach is the same as the
property view, which regards the commencement of the bankruptcy not as changing
the corporate form of the debtor or transferring its property, but recognizing
that changes may be made to the debtor or its property during the course of the
bankruptcy.
A fundamental way in which individual bankruptcies under chapters 7 and 11

differ from a corporate bankruptcy, stems from the fact that an individual is
permitted to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate, 87 and money that an
individual earns after the commencement of the case does not become part of the
estate. 88 This requires some differences in tax treatment. 89 The individual
also receives the key benefit of having her debts discharged by the bankruptcy.
90 This treatment is quite different from the corporation, all the assets of
which, whether received before or after the bankruptcy, are available to satisfy
creditors. 91
The tax laws recognize this difference by treating individuals in chapters 7 or
11 differently from bankrupt corporations. The Tax Code treats the bankruptcy
estate as a separate taxable entity from the individual, requiring the
bankruptcy trustee to file tax returns on behalf of the estate. 92 While such an
approach is in accordance with the new person view, it is a weak argument for a
general characterization of the legal nature of bankruptcy estates. Separate
treatment does not apply to corporate or partnership bankruptcies, and does not
even apply to all individual bankruptcies. 93 Moreover, the separate taxation of
the individual debtor
[*483] and the estate falls far short of treating the estate as a new legal
person who is the transferee of the debtor's property. There are indeed two
taxable entities where before there was just one. Yet for practical purposes the
newly created entity is not the estate; it is the debtor. The tax attributes of
the debtor belong to the estate, not to the debtor. 94 The estate receives not
only the tax attributes that would seem to go along with the property, such as
the basis in the debtor's property, but also net operating losses and charitable
contribution carryovers. 95 Thus, for tax purposes, the estate continues the
debtor's tax life, and the debtor becomes a new taxable entity created for the
debtor's exempted property and post-petition earnings. This treatment is in
accordance with the differences between an individual and corporate bankruptcy.
These differences in tax treatment arise not at the creation of the estate,
which is common to bankruptcy, but rather as a result of the differences between
the types of bankruptcy, specifically the exempting property and excepting
post-petition earnings. 96 Even this treatment, however, does not accord with
the new person view, under which the estate is the newly created entity that
would have a tax life of its own and not be affected by the debtor's rights and
obligations, other than receiving the transfer of the debtor's property.
Finally, not only is the estate not treated as a new entity, it is not treated
as completely distinct from the debtor. This is reflected in the fact that
despite the separate taxable entities, the tax treatment of the debtor can
affect the tax treatment of the estate. This appears most clearly in the
discharge of indebtedness rules, which govern matters central to an individual
bankruptcy. 97 A principal reason for an individual to go into bankruptcy is to
have her debts discharged at the termination of the case. Normally, when a
taxpayer has indebtedness discharged without paying the debt, the taxpayer must
recognize taxable income. 98 If A borrows $ 1000 from B, A has no taxable
income, for although A received $ 1,000 in cash, A also received an offsetting
liability to pay B $ 1,000. Where there is no net gain to A, there is no taxable
income. If, however, A's debt is discharged without A repaying the money, for
example if B forgives the debt, then A normally must recognize $ 1,000 of
income; A has a net gain of $ 1,000. An exception to the rule occurs if A is
insolvent or is in bankruptcy. [*484] A does not have to recognize any income
because she is unable to pay her debts , so she receives no benefit from
forgiveness of the debt. If A is insolvent, then A must reduce her tax
attributes. If A's debts are discharged in bankruptcy, then the estate has to
reduce the tax attributes assumed from A. 99 This interplay between the tax
treatment of A and the tax treatment of the estate emphasizes that the tax laws

do not treat them as the independent entities that the new person view does.
Consideration of the relevant provisions of both the Code and the Internal
Revenue Code, then, provides scant support for the new person view. Rather, both
consistently favor the property view. Because the statutes do not absolutely
exclude an interpretation relying on the new person view, however, we could use
the new person approach should it prove to be a sounder basis for the analysis
of questions that arise during a bankruptcy case. The next sections consider
whether the new person view would nevertheless lend clarity to the analysis of
important issues that arise during bankruptcy.

II. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS

The area of executory contracts is key to any discussion of the legal nature of
the bankruptcy estate. Both the new person view and its predecessor, the new
entity view, were largely developed in this area. The new entity approach was
developed as a way to explain the trustee's power to reject or assume executory
contracts to which the debtor is a party at the commencement of the bankruptcy.
After the Bildisco decision appeared to reject the new entity approach,
theoretical writing on executory contracts revived its functional aspects in the
most thorough exposition of the new person view. 100 The new entity view is no
longer needed to justify the power to assume or reject executory contracts, as
section 365 now grants such power specifically. 101 Several interpretive
questions remain open, however, regarding executory contracts which are affected
by how one views the legal nature of the bankruptcy estate: the treatment of
contracts that are "personal" to the debtor, whether the trustee can enforce an
executory contract before assuming or rejecting it, whether the debtor remains
[*485] a party to contracts that the trustee does not or cannot assume, and
whether a debtor in possession may assume executory contracts that a trustee
could not have assumed. Each of the issues could be resolved quickly by treating
the estate as a new legal person that becomes a party to the contract only if
the trustee or debtor in possession assumes the contract. Such resolutions,
though, lead to unnecessary complications in each area. By contrast, the
property view necessitates a sounder analysis by requiring us to deal directly
with the specific policies, rather than circumventing them.

A. Bildisco Rejects The New Entity Theory, But It Returns As The New Person View

The new entity view, predecessor to the new person view, grew out of efforts by
some courts to deal with executory contracts, contracts to which the debtor is a
party and that have not yet been fully performed by both parties. Courts have
long held that when a debtor goes into bankruptcy, the trustee or debtor in
possession is not necessarily required to perform the debtor's obligations under
an executory contract. 102 Rather, the trustee or debtor in possession has the
power to choose to reject or assume the contract, subject to court approval. 103
Before the Bankruptcy Act or the Code explicitly provided the trustee with the
right to assume or reject executory contracts, however, authority differed on
the source of such a power. Some courts held that executory contracts were
simply property of the estate, which the trustee was free to use or abandon like
other estate property. 104 Other courts reasoned that commencement of the
[*486] bankruptcy case breached the contract by operation of law, but the
trustee could cure the breach by assuming the contract. 105 Both of these views
are unsatisfactory. The first would require the trustee to pay for the use of

estate property, which is not normally required, and the second would require
the development of a new view of contract law. 106 The new entity view was a
third attempt to provide a basis for the right to reject or assume executory
contracts. Courts reasoned that the trustee or debtor in possession was a new
legal entity created by bankruptcy law which was not a party to the debtor's
existing contracts and thus was only bound by them if they were assumed. 107
The new entity view was not a secure basis for the right to reject or assume
executory contracts. The lack of a sound judicial basis was corrected by
legislative action, however, by specifically granting this power in the
Bankruptcy Act 108 and subsequently in section 365 of the Code. 109 Although
that need for the new entity view disappeared, the potential power of the
doctrine to support desired results for other questions regarding executory
contracts and various issues in bankruptcy law remained. In the leading case of
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 110 reliance on the
new entity view enabled the Second Circuit to circumvent an apparent conflict
between the federal labor and bankruptcy laws. 111 The debtor in possession, a
steel maker, sought to reject a collective bargaining agreement as an executory
contract. 112 The union argued that the contract could not be rejected without
compliance
[*487] with provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 113 governing
procedures and conditions for terminating or modifying a labor agreement. 114
The court held, however, that the debtor in possession was a new entity and
therefore was not a party to the labor agreement. 115 Accordingly, it was not
subject to the termination restrictions which applied to a "party" to a labor
agreement. 116 Thus, the court did not have to decide whether the bankruptcy or
the labor laws controlled the apparent conflict. The bankruptcy laws did
effectively trump the labor laws, though, by creating an entity that acquired
the property of the debtor without being subject to the restrictions on that
property that had applied to the debtor.
The new entity view, however, suffered a grievous blow in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco. 117 Bildisco & Bildisco, a general partnership in the building
supplies business, was also a party to a collective bargaining agreement. 118
The partnership filed a chapter 11 petition and continued to operate the
business as a debtor in possession. 119 Bildisco & Bildisco failed to meet
several of its obligations under the collective bargaining agreement and
subsequently rejected the collective bargaining agreement with approval of the
bankruptcy court. 120 The National Labor Relations Board found that Bildisco &
Bildisco had violated the National Labor Relations Act by unilaterally changing
the conditions of the collective bargaining agreement and refusing to negotiate
with the union. 121 The Third Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order,
holding that the debtor in possession was a "new entity" not bound by the
collective bargaining agreement. 122 Furthermore, because of the special status
of collective bargaining agreements, the debtor in possession must meet a more
stringent test than the usual "business judgment" rule to reject an executory
contract. 123 A party seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement must
show that the agreement is burdensome and that the equities balance in favor of
rejection. 124
[*488]
The Supreme Court affirmed. 125 The
short cut offered by the new entity
specific issues. The Court rejected
without much analysis. As the Court

decision, however, did not rely upon the
view, but rather upon examination of the
the new entity approach succinctly, indeed,
explained:

Much effort has been expended by the parties on the question of whether the
debtor is more properly characterized as an "alter ego" or a "successor
employer" of the prebankruptcy debtor, as those terms have been used in our
labor decisions. We see no profit in an exhaustive effort to identify which, if
either, of these terms represents the closest analogy to the
debtorin-possession. Obviously if the latter were a wholly "new entity," it
would be unnecessary for the Bankruptcy Code to allow it to reject executory
contracts, since it would not be bound by such contracts in the first place. For
our purposes, it is sensible to view the debtor-in-possession as the same
"entity" which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, but
empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts and
property in a manner it could not have employed absent the bankruptcy filing.
126

Although the debtor in possession thus remained a party to the collective
bargaining agreement, the Court held that it did not violate the labor laws by
failing to meet its obligations under the contract. 127 Under chapter 11, the
trustee or debtor in possession has until confirmation of the reorganization
plan to assume or reject executory contracts, although it must pay the other
party the reasonable value of any performance it elects to receive in the
interim. 128 From this, the Court reasoned that the collective bargaining
agreement was not enforceable against the debtor in possession until assumption,
and therefore, in the interim, the Board could not require the debtor in
possession to perform under the contract. 129
Bildisco indirectly blocks further reliance on the new entity view as the
conceptual basis for executory contract law. In an exchange of articles with Jay
Westbrook that cleared away much of the obscurity and needless technicalities of
executory contract law, Michael Andrew revived the functional aspects of the new
entity approach. 130 This perspective, the new
[*489] person view, respects the Bildisco holding that the debtor and the
debtor in possession are the same entity. Under Andrew's approach, as under the
new entity approach, when the debtor goes into bankruptcy, an executory contract
does not become part of the estate. 131 The debtor remains a party to the
contract. If and when the trustee assumes the contract, then the estate becomes
a party to the contract. Thus, the new person view does not claim that the
debtor in possession is a new legal entity, but makes that fact irrelevant:

A number of courts in executory contracts cases have puzzled over whether the
debtor in possession is a "new entity" as compared to the debtor, in trying to
decide whether the debtor in possession is bound by the debtor's contracts prior
to assumption. What is important, however, is that the estate clearly is a new
entity. The debtor in possession is the debtor, see Bankruptcy Code Sec.
1101(1), acting in a trust capacity as representative of that estate. The debtor
can be displaced at any time by an independent trustee; thus, nothing should
turn on whether the debtor and the debtor in possession are the same entity. The
important issue is not whether the debtor in possession is bound by the debtor's
contracts, but whether the estate is. 132

Thus, the new person view, developed as a response to Bildisco preserves the

effect, if not the form, of the new entity theory.
Despite respecting Bildisco's holding on whether the debtor and debtor in
possession are different entities, the new person view does significantly depart
from Bildisco's analysis. The Court squarely rejected the debtor in possession's
argument that it was not a party to the labor agreement and therefore had no
obligations under the relevant labor laws. 133 Consider an application of
Bildisco's facts using the new person model. Under this view, the debtor in
possession would be able to avoid the Bildisco result. The new person approach
views the debtor in possession as an agent of the estate. Because the labor
agreement would not have been assumed, the estate would not be a party to the
agreement; thus the debtor in possession, acting as the estate's representative,
would not have any obligations under the contract. This hypothetical parallels
the very argument that the Court rejected. 134 Indeed, the new person view would
[*490] complicate the analysis of Bildisco and provide little useful guidance.
The new person view recognizes, however, that the debtor in possession is the
same person as the debtor. The new person approach also introduces an additional
person to the picture, the bankruptcy estate, that becomes a party to the
contract only if the contract is assumed by the agent of the estate. Until
assumption, the debtor remains a party to the contract. Thus, in the interim,
the debtor in its own right, not as debtor in possession, theoretically
continues to be subject to such obligations. Because all of its property had
been transferred to the estate, however, the empty-handed debtor has little with
which to bargain.
Furthermore, during the period between the commencement of the bankruptcy and
assumption or rejection of the contract, the estate, a stranger to the contract,
would not be able to elect to receive performance from the other party. 135 The
Bildisco Court, however, held that the debtor in possession could continue to
elect to receive performance from the other party, provided that the debtor in
possession continued to pay for the rendered performance. 136 This holding
cannot be explained by viewing the debtor, as opposed to the estate, as
receiving such performance in the interim because the money to pay for it would
obviously have to come out of the estate. These complications are absent under
the property view, which sees the debtor as the remaining party to the contract
and recognizes that payments for performance are drawn from the estate.
The new person view also raises another possible problem during the interim
before the contract is assumed or rejected. The automatic stay protects property
of the estate but not property outside the estate. 137 If the contract became
property of the estate only if assumed, then the other party could terminate the
contract during the interim period. This course of action, if taken, defeats the
ability to elect to receive performance during the interim. Under the property
view, however, the contract remains part of the estate and is therefore
protected. 138
[*491]
The new person approach also introduces some distortions into the rights and
obligations arising from executory contracts. A central principle of executory
contract law is that no more or less than the debtor's interest in the contract
passes into the estate. 139 The new person view, however, can be used to
circumvent this principle. For example, if the debtor is a party to a contract
with an arbitration clause, the new person view would not bind the estate to
arbitrate disputes arising out of the contract because the estate was not a
party to the contract. The property view, on the other hand, takes the better
approach by specifically examining both the relevant bankruptcy and arbitration

law issues in order to decide which is the more appropriate forum. 140
In addition to supporting attempts to shed obligations, the new person view can
also be used to increase contractual rights. For example, a recent analysis of
the effect of bankruptcy on director and officer liability policies suggests
that bankruptcy may effect an increase in the scope of the liability. 141
Typically, such policies provide no protection where a corporation sues its own
directors or officers. 142 The reason is that the corporation, its directors,
and its officers are all designated as "insureds" under the policy, and the
policies usually specifically exclude coverage of "insured v. insured" actions.
143 Suppose the corporation goes into bankruptcy, and the trustee or the debtor
in possession sues the officers, alleging pre-petition misuse of corporate
funds. If the estate is a new legal person, distinct from the corporation listed
as an insured on the policy, then the suit would arguably no longer be subject
to the "insured v. insured" exclusion. 144 Thus, simply by filing bankruptcy,
the debtor's contractual [*492] rights are effectively increased.
The new person view also leads to an added risk for the nonbankrupt party. If
the contract does not become part of the estate, then the debtor in possession
could attempt to enforce the contract against the other party, despite the fact
that all or most of the debtor's assets have been put into the bankruptcy
estate. 145 This occurrence would in effect grant the debtor a free option on
the contract. 146 The problems caused by the new person view unnecessarily
multiplying the entities involved become even clearer when we recall that
section 365 not only grants a general power to assume or reject executory
contracts, but also provides that the trustee cannot assume certain executory
contracts, such as contracts to make a loan to the debtor. 147 Suppose that a
bank has a contractual commitment to make a loan to the debtor. If the debtor
goes into bankruptcy, section 365(c) would clearly bar assumption of the
contract by the trustee, the rationale being that a lender cannot be required to
lend money to a bankrupt. Under the new person view, though, executory contracts
remain with the debtor, even though the debtor no longer has any assets.

B. Assumption and Rejection of Personal Contracts

The treatment of personal executory contracts, those made in special
[*493] reliance on the debtor, leads to the most dramatic effects of the new
person view. Contract law has long recognized the limitations on a contracting
party's ability to assign rights or obligations under what I will call a
personal contract. 148 Similar limitations apply when one of the parties files
for bankruptcy. Under section 365, the power of the bankruptcy trustee to assume
executory contracts is subject to an important limitation: the trustee may not
assume an executory contract that is nonassignable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, such as a personal services contract. 149 Section 365
codifies the historical practice of prohibiting the trustee from assuming a
personal contract. 150 Two issues, however, are left unresolved by section 365:
does section 365 apply to a debtor in possession; and does it apply to
rejection, as opposed to assumption? The analysis of both issues depends on
whether the estate is considered a new legal person.
Michael Andrew argues that the analysis is unaffected by the substitution of a
trustee for the debtor in possession. 151 While his rationale may be the most
persuasive in support of the new person view, his argument ultimately fails.
First, any uniformity in such cases is greatly outweighed by the other
distortions common to the new person approach. The area of personal contracts

provides a perfect example as to why the difference between a trustee and a
debtor in possession should sometimes be considered in the analysis. Under
section 365(c), the trustee may not assume an executory contract if applicable
law excuses the other party "from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or debtor in possession." 152 The
provision clearly prevents a trustee from assuming a personal contract. Courts
have ruled differently, however, on whether it prevents a debtor in possession
from assuming a personal contract. 153
Once again, the new person view answers the question too readily: a
[*494] debtor in possession simply exercises the powers of a trustee, who is
the agent of the estate. If a trustee could not assume a personal contract, then
a debtor in possession could not. But this logic circumvents both the policy and
the statutory interpretation issues. The policy behind the rule against
assumption of personal contracts is that under bankruptcy law, the nonbankrupt
party signed a contract with the debtor who could not assign the contract to
another party. The classic example is a contract for personal services. A
contracts for the personal services of B; B cannot assign the contract to C, who
may be ready to provide services of a similar nature, but not the personal
services of B. Similarly, if B files for bankruptcy, A should not have to accept
the personal services of B's bankruptcy trustee. Where B remains the debtor in
possession, the rationale is less persuasive. There would be no transfer of
services from B to the bankruptcy trustee. B would still be providing the
services; what has changed is that B is subject to new rights and obligations as
the debtor in possession.
The statutory issue is whether Congress mandated different treatment by
legislating that a trustee could not assume a contract where otherwise
applicable law excuses the other party "from accepting performance from or
rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or debtor in
possession." 154 The issue of whether a debtor in possession may assume a
personal contract is unresolved, as courts have ruled both ways. 155 The
property view would not mandate an outcome, but would force the analysis to
address both the policy issue and the ambiguous statutory language.
The new person view also oversimplifies the analysis of the rejection of
personal contracts. Two cases involving entertainers illustrate how the use of
the new person view can distort the analysis by circumventing the real issues.
In In re Carrere, 156 the debtor was an actress under contract with a television
network to appear in a daytime soap opera. She received a much more lucrative
offer to appear regularly in a prime time series. She filed a chapter 11
petition as a way of rejecting the soap opera contract. [*495] In its second
argument, the network asserted that the bankruptcy petition should be dismissed
because it was filed in bad faith. 157 The court, however, approached the matter
as an issue arising under section 365, applying a version of the new person
view. 158 The court first noted that a trustee could not have assumed such a
contract, because the contract was "excluded" from the estate. 159 The court
then discussed whether this prevented a debtor in possession from rejecting such
a contract:

Upon the filing of a Chapter 11, Ms. Carrere created a new entity called a
debtor-in-possession. That debtor-in-possession is not identical to the debtor
herself. She is granted the rights and duties of a trustee (11 U.S.C. section
323). Therefore while the debtor (Tia Carrere) may have duties under the ABC
contract and may wish to reject those duties, the debtor-in-possession (who
represents the estate of Tia Carrere) has no rights or duties whatsoever in the

contract and therefore is a stranger to it. 160

As a stranger to the contract, the debtor in possession had "no interest in the
proceeds of the personal service contract, nor in the contract itself." 161 This
would be only a temporary setback, for even if the debtor in possession could
not reject the contract, her contractual obligations would be discharged along
with the rest of her debts at the close of the case.
The court's alternative holdings came closer to the real issues and indicated a
surer way of resolving the matter. The court held that even if the debtor in
possession could reject such a contract, it would not be permitted in this case
because such a result would be inequitable. 162 The court also held that in any
case, rejection would not prevent the nonbankrupt party from pursuing its
equitable remedies in addition to monetary damages. 163 By relying primarily on
the new person view to deal with an apparent bad faith attempt to get out of a
personal contract, the court left a bad precedent for a case in which a debtor
in genuine financial distress sought a fresh start. Such analysis avoided the
real issue and resulted in too broad a rule.
[*496]
In In re Taylor, 164 James Taylor, the former lead singer of the band Kool and
the Gang, had signed personal services contracts that required him, among other
things, to make a number of record albums. 165 Payment was to be made, with some
advance payments already made, to a corporation which was obligated to pay
Taylor. 166 The corporation became insolvent. Taylor was left with an obligation
to make several albums for which he was unlikely to receive payment. Taylor
filed chapter 11 and sought to reject the contracts. 167 Rejection is more
strongly supported by the facts of Taylor than those of Carrere. Rather than
using bankruptcy simply as a means to unload a less lucrative contractual
obligation, Taylor genuinely sought a fresh start. His liabilities significantly
exceeded his assets, and he had no prospect of being able to pay all his
creditors. Under Carrere's broad approach, however, such facts would be
irrelevant. Because the debtor in possession could not assume the contract or
its proceeds for the estate, the debtor in possession was a stranger to the
contract and had no power to reject it. The Taylor court, however, took an
approach consistent with the property view, holding that even if a contract
could not be assumed, it could still be rejected. 168
Thus the new person view, which arose as an attempt to find an analytically
elegant way to explain the power to assume or reject contracts, leads
paradoxically to both oversimplification and unnecessary complications. 169 Many
such problems arise from the dichotomy the new person view creates between the
debtor and the person to which the debtor's property would be transferred - the
estate. In contrast, the property view, tends to leave the property vested in
the debtor, although subject to the various protections in the Code, therefore
avoiding a number of unnecessary analytical obstacles and shortcuts.

III. CORPORATE POWERS, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The property and new person theories present considerably different viewpoints
of what happens to a corporation when it goes into bankruptcy. Under the
property view, the corporation is simply the corporation [*497] in bankruptcy.

If the debtor remains in possession, then the corporate structure remains
essentially intact, but the corporation also has the powers and the duties of a
trustee. If a trustee is appointed, then the trustee would largely replace the
corporation's management within the existing corporate structure. The
corporation's property is not transferred to another entity, but becomes the
estate and thus is subject to the automatic stay, as well as other provisions of
the Code.
Under the new person view, things are quite different. There is a complete
separation between the debtor corporation and the new legal person in which the
debtor's former property is vested, the estate. Whether the debtor remains in
possession or a trustee is appointed, the debtor maintains a completely separate
legal existence. If a trustee is appointed, then the trustee acts as an agent of
the estate. If the debtor remains in possession, the debtor corporation acts as
an agent and fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate. Regardless of whether the
debtor remains in possession, the debtor would be subject to new duties by the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. In chapters 7 and 11, if a trustee is
appointed, the debtor must file lists of creditors, assets, and liabilities and
meet its other duties under section 521 and other provisions of the Code. 170 In
chapter 11, the debtor in possession would also be subject to the duties of a
trustee, but these duties would be external to the corporate entity of the
debtor. 171 The internal matters of corporate governance and fiduciary duties
would not be directly implicated.
Various issues can arise in bankruptcy concerning the corporate powers and the
corporate governance of the debtor: who is entitled to exercise the corporate
powers of the debtor, what are the fiduciary duties of the debtor's management
and directors and to whom do they run, and whether the shareholders of the
debtor can hold elections of directors. Under the new person view, these issues
could be resolved simply. The debtor would be a completely separate legal person
from the bankruptcy estate, whose corporate powers would not become powers of
the bankruptcy estate. A debtor in possession would not be entitled or required
to exercise its own corporate powers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, because
in its role as debtor in possession it would only have powers derivative of the
estate. The fiduciary duties and corporate elections of directors and officers
would not be directly affected, because only the debtor's property, not its
corporate structure, would be subject to the bankruptcy
[*498] proceeding.
This apparent simplicity, however, belies the two key faults of the new person
view. In each of the areas discussed below, the new person view would often
either oversimplify or unnecessarily complicate the analysis. These failings in
turn all trace back to the cleavage the new person view imposes between the
debtor corporation and its property by vesting the property in a new legal
person. Creditors, shareholders, and other parties in interest have rights and
obligations with respect not just to the property of the debtor, but also to the
debtor itself. The corporation, not simply its property, is the subject of the
bankruptcy process, especially in reorganizations. The new person view, by
taking into account only the corporation's property, sows the seeds of its own
analytical shortcomings.

A. Corporate Powers

We saw above that with respect to executory contracts, the new person view is
problematic in that the estate could either gain rights or shed obligations

under an executory contract by claiming to be a nonparty to the contract. The
area of corporate powers raises a different problem: the diminution in value of
the estate. This could occur because only the property of the debtor would pass
to the estate, thereby separating it from the corporate powers of the debtor
which are needed to maximize the value of the estate. 172 Thus, the new person
view again causes deviations from the basic norm that filing bankruptcy should
not change the existing rights of the debtor and other parties in interest. This
section will discuss two types of corporate powers, the right to waive the
attorney-client privilege and the exercise of corporate powers necessary to use
particular pieces of property.
The power to waive the attorney-client privilege poses a good example of how the
new person view would oversimplify the analysis of an issue by bypassing an
investigation of the real issues. To take a typical case, an officer of the
debtor confers in confidence with an attorney representing the debtor. The
debtor subsequently goes into bankruptcy and a trustee is appointed. The trustee
seeks to waive the attorney-client privilege. Under the new person view, the
analysis would be simple. The communication was between the debtor and its
attorney. The legal person that
[*499] the trustee or debtor in possession represents is the bankruptcy
estate, not the debtor. The privilege would remain under the control of the
management of the debtor. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue in the
key situation, where the debtor remains in possession, but has dealt with it in
a trustee case, in a manner consistent with the property view. In Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 173 the Seventh Circuit essentially
followed the reasoning outlined above in holding that the trustee could not
waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-petition communications.
Thus, the new person view superseded the more subtle issues involved.
Although not directly addressing either the new person or property view, the
Supreme Court reversed, relying on reasoning that implicitly rejected the new
person view. 174 In sharp contrast to the Seventh Circuit's reliance on the new
person view to make a complex issue simple, the Court looked to how the specific
rights and duties accorded the trustee under the Code related to existing law on
the attorney-client privilege. The Code authorizes the trustee to operate the
debtor's business, sell or lease estate property, investigate the debtor's
financial affairs, and bring actions to recover fraudulently transferred
property. 175 In short, the trustee assumes the bulk of the management activity
of the debtor. Outside bankruptcy, where management of a corporation is
replaced, the new managers control the attorney-client privilege with respect to
previous communications. 176 By analogy, the Court reasoned, a trustee who
displaces the management of the bankrupt corporation should similarly control
the attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-petition communications. 177
Especially important for present purposes is that the Court viewed the trustee
as the displacing management of the debtor, rather than acting as the manager of
a new legal person. 178 Outside bankruptcy, if Corporation A's property was sold
to Corporation B, the management of Corporation B would hardly be able to waive
Corporation A's attorney-client privilege. Thus, the Court, acting consistently
with the property theory, viewed the trustee as replacing existing management,
not as managing [*500] a newly created legal person.
Although the case before the Court involved a trustee, its reasoning gains
support if we consider the same issue where the debtor remains in possession and
wields the powers of a trustee. Under the property view, the analysis is
straightforward and rightly so. Where the debtor remains in possession, it is
entitled to waive its own attorney-client privilege. The new person view makes a
simple issue much more complicated than is necessary. The estate itself would

not have the right to waive the privilege with respect to pre-petition
communications because the estate was not a party to such communications. Nor
could the debtor in possession waive the privilege by virtue of being the
representative of the estate. Of course the debtor could waive the privilege
because it was the client at the time of the communication. This creates a
strange conflict of interest, similar to that discussed in the next section with
respect to fiduciary duties. 179 Suppose that X, an individual who was an
officer of Corporation A, conferred confidentially with her attorney, not in her
capacity as an officer of Corporation A, but rather with respect to her own
legal situation. X would not be bound to waive the privilege if it would benefit
Corporation A, simply by virtue of her position. Exactly such a rule would be
necessary for a debtor in possession to exercise its own corporate powers on
behalf of another legal person. Thus, in order to conclude that a debtor in
possession could waive the privilege with respect to pre-petition
communications, the new person view would have to extricate itself from the
unnecessary complications of its own making. The new person view made things too
simple in the case of the trustee, and too complicated in the case of the debtor
in possession.
Similar problems arise in situations where use of a particular piece of property
requires exercise of a corporate power. I will specifically examine the
separation of the debtor's property from those corporate powers needed to
realize the value of such property. 180 Suppose a corporation is
[*501] the beneficiary of a letter of credit. To draw on the letter of credit,
the debtor must present a certificate to which the secretary of the corporation
has attested. The debtor goes into bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed, and the
letter of credit becomes property of the estate. In Farmer v. Crocker National
Bank (In re Swift Aire Lines), 181 the Ninth Circuit held that it is impossible
to draw on the letter of credit after it becomes property of the estate because
the estate is a new legal entity distinct from the debtor corporation. The court
considered the separation between the debtor and the estate so complete that the
debtor's officers no longer had any authority to act with respect to property of
the estate. 182 Once again, the new person view might have been used as a
shortcut to reach the correct result. In Farmer, the letter of credit may have
been part of a larger transaction that would have, in effect, required a loan to
be made to the bankrupt corporation, and the Code normally excuses lenders from
obligations to lend once bankruptcy has occurred. 183 Rather than just holding
that the letter of credit in that case need not be honored, which would have
required carefully analyzing the entire transaction, the court used the new
person view to hold generally that letters of credit requiring a certificate
from the debtor need not be honored in bankruptcy. 184
Taken at face value, such a holding is contrary to at least two provisions of
the Code designed to avoid such distortions in existing rights and obligations.
Section 541 provides that property of the debtor goes into the estate,
notwithstanding provisions against transfer or provisions that change
obligations upon bankruptcy of the debtor. 185 Such a safeguard would be negated
if the property goes into the estate but cannot be used. The Code also requires
the debtor to cooperate with the trustee, 186 and
[*502] even specifically requires the debtor to execute any instrument
necessary to consummate a reorganization. 187 Such requirements would similarly
be unproductive if the debtor's actions could no longer affect estate property.
Clearly such provisions indicate that the Code implicitly follows the property
approach in viewing the debtor as retaining meaningful corporate powers.
A way to retain the new person view and also permit the estate to take advantage
of the aforementioned corporate powers of the debtor would be to consider such

corporate powers to be "property" that passes to the estate. Apart from the
inherent difficulty of such a broad conception of property, this would
effectively strip the debtor of all its powers and pass them to the estate.
Thus, there would be little left of the debtor but its name, or perhaps not even
that under such a broad conception of property. 188 The result would be that the
estate would effectively become the debtor corporation, vested with all its
property and all its corporate powers. The debtor would still exist, but as a
meaningless shell. This is really no different from the new entity theory
rejected by Bildisco, that upon the commencement of the bankruptcy case the
debtor corporation disappears and becomes reestablished as a new and separate
legal entity, the debtor in possession. 189 Moreover, such a complicated means
to reinvent the debtor corporation is unnecessary where the property view offers
a means to keep the powers of the debtor associated with its property in a much
simpler fashion.

B. Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Elections in Bankruptcy

In the last few years, courts and commentators have directed considerable
attention to the fiduciary duties of the officers and directors of a debtor in
possession. 190 Some hold that such fiduciary duties clearly run to
[*503] both creditors and shareholders, or to the estate as a whole, under
existing law. 191 Other courts state that once the corporation becomes
insolvent, whether in or out of bankruptcy, the fiduciary duties run only to the
corporation's creditors, as the shareholders no longer have a valid interest in
the corporation. 192 Some commentators fall somewhere in between, depending on
the particular fact pattern. 193
Under the property view, state corporate law largely guides the analysis of such
fiduciary duties. Of course, analysis based on state law is subject to any
provisions of federal bankruptcy law which require a different result in certain
situations. The property view does not favor any one position in a particular
case. The property view, which sees the debtor simply as the corporation in
bankruptcy, asks what state law requires of the directors and officers in a
particular situation. The mere fact of bankruptcy should not control the issue.
The property view's inquiry into state law also requires consideration of other
factors, such as whether the corporation is insolvent, whether it is a closely
held corporation, and what corporate law exists in the specific jurisdiction.
The new person view, on the other hand, offers a simpler approach.
[*504] The debtor in possession acts as a representative of the estate, and
the duties of the officers and directors therefore simply run to the estate.
Such clarity breaks down quickly when separate entities with different interests
in the estate are affected differently by what is done with the estate property.
The parties with an interest in the estate -- secured creditors, unsecured
creditors, and stockholders -- are likely to differ as to the best way to
administer it. Thus, regarding the estate as a new person whose interests are at
issue only masks such conflicts.
In contrast, the property view, reminds us that the estate is only property and
that the persons with interests at stake are those with an interest in that
property, and in the debtor corporation generally. This distinction becomes
clearer as we consider two specific attempts to provide an analytical framework
relying on the new person view. The first attempt arrives at essentially the
same result as the property view, but through an unnecessarily complicated
framework. The second acknowledges that the determination of fiduciary duties

will ultimately require state law based analysis, but seeks to avoid this
inquiry by dispensing with fiduciary duties completely. An analysis relying on
the new person view to provide a clear division between the estate and the
debtor corporation, however, must examine state law, or the division will
ultimately break down.
Raymond Nimmer and Richard Feinberg have analyzed many of the corporate
governance issues under a version of the new person view. 194 Their view
actually falls somewhere between the new entity and the new person views. They
attempt to regard the debtor in possession as the same entity as the debtor, as
well as a newly created entity. 195 This is presumably to avoid running afoul of
Bildisco. I largely agree with their conclusions, but think that the
introduction of a new entity unnecessarily complicates the analysis. Indeed,
their analysis could be reformulated in a simple way that would also be
consistent with Bildisco.
Nimmer and Feinberg begin with the premise that the debtor in possession is
"both a designation of status and a creation of an artificial legal entity." 196
Thus, the chapter 11 petition both modifies the rights and obligations of the
debtor and creates a new artificial legal entity. 197 This premise is both
contrary to Bildisco and confusing. Under Bildisco, the
[*505] debtor in possession is the former debtor, 198 which accords with the
Code definition: " 'debtor in possession' means debtor." 199 Nimmer and
Feinberg's view reduces the position of the debtor in possession from debtor to
a new legal entity with certain rights and obligations. 200 Perhaps they are
attempting to accommodate both the position that the filing of the petition
replaces the debtor with a new legal entity called the debtor in possession and
the position that the debtor does not disappear. 201 This attempt creates the
following problem, however: if the debtor still exists and the debtor in
possession is a new legal entity, what or who is this new legal entity? It
cannot be the debtor because then the new legal entity would be an existing
legal entity. In the end, Nimmer and Feinberg's analysis does not specifically
identify anything or anyone as the debtor in possession. Rather, the debtor in
possession is said to be "associated with" the managers of the debtor. 202
Nimmer and Feinberg further recognize that their position creates the problem of
distinguishing between two overlapping entities, one of which is rather
ill-defined. 203 Their solution is that "the metaphysics of distinguishing two
artificial and overlapping legal entities need never be addressed in general
terms." 204 Rather, they recommend that the analysis look to the "specific
characteristics of the [debtor in possession] and the consequences of those
characteristics" for corporate governance issues. 205 But this theory appears to
be an indirect path to the point that the property view would go to directly:
the debtor in possession is the same legal entity as the pre-existing debtor,
but now must account for its modified rights and obligations. Indeed, the rest
of their analysis is largely consistent with this approach. They conclude that
management has obligations not only to the shareholders of the debtor but also
to its creditors. 206 Nimmer and Feinberg support this result by relying heavily
on the nonbankruptcy rule that "generally, corporate officers and directors
stand in a fiduciary relationship with respect to their corporation and its
shareholders. However, when the corporation is insolvent, these duties run to
the
[*506] creditors." 207 In addition, the debtor in possession has new duties to
the creditors because the managers became the debtor in possession, although
such duties do not supplant the fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders. 208 Rather, those nonbankruptcy duties remain in place, resulting
in a "bifurcated responsibility." 209

A simpler way to reach a similar result would be to say that under nonbankruptcy
law, management has fiduciary duties to the corporation, its shareholders, and,
if the corporation is insolvent, its creditors. Furthermore, the corporation, as
debtor in possession, would still be subject to the additional duties imposed by
the Code. This statement is exactly what the property approach would dictate.
Though there would still be a need to reconcile competing interests, analysis of
particular issues would be made clearer. In determining what the obligations of
management or the corporation are with respect to any issue, the initial
question should aim to establish the source of the alleged duty. If the duty is
one imposed by the Code, then it should be considered with reference to the
relevant provision. Alternatively, if the duty is one imposed by corporate law,
then it should be considered with reference to the state corporate law at issue.
This would not be a simple matter. The analysis would likely have to take into
consideration the state of incorporation, whether the corporation was insolvent,
whether it was a close corporation, and any other facts made relevant by state
corporate law. This is the same body of law, however, on which the approach of
Nimmer and Feinberg would ultimately rely.
The new person view does not make analysis of the fiduciary duties of the
corporation's officers and directors any easier; but perhaps it could be used to
do away with the need for such analysis completely. Thomas Kelch has made a bold
proposal that attempts to simplify the analysis of fiduciary duty issues in
bankruptcy: that the debtor in possession should have no fiduciary duties at
all. 210 Kelch reasoned that it would be better for the debtor in possession to
have no fiduciary duties at all, given the number of difficulties he sees in
determining what those duties would be. 211 His reliance on the new person view,
however, causes his analysis
[*507] to overstate the likely benefits of his proposal and to undercut the
attempt at simplicity by introducing even more complications.
Kelch recognized that the accepted view is that the debtor in possession does
have fiduciary duties, 212 but after surveying some of the decisions in the
area, he sees two principal problems. First, the content of the fiduciary duty
of the debtor in possession is undefined. 213 There is a considerable body of
law with respect to the fiduciary duties of insolvent corporations's officers
and directors, 214 and several commentators have specifically attempted to
delineate the content of those duties when the corporation is in bankruptcy. 215
But, under Kelch's view, these efforts have yet to yield a clear set of
guidelines governing debtors in possession. 216 No case gives a comprehensive
definition of the fiduciary duty of the debtor in possession. Some areas of the
law have little case law on point, and the cases in the remaining areas are
inconsistent with many of the results determined by the particular facts
accompanied by judicial bromides. 217 Moreover, systematic attempts to work out
guidelines based on the general principles of fiduciary duty have failed. 218
The second major problem, in Kelch's view, is that the debtor in possession has
unresolvable conflicts among the interests of the potential beneficiaries of its
fiduciary duties. 219 There are many situations in which the optimal use of the
corporation's assets would be viewed differently by stockholders, unsecured
creditors, and secured creditors, and even differently [*508] within those
categories. 220 To take the most common example, secured creditors would often
prefer that they be permitted to foreclose on collateral to satisfy their claim,
while unsecured creditors and stockholders would prefer that the collateral be
used in the debtor's business, even at the risk of loss of the collateral's
value, in hopes of increasing the value of the estate as a whole. 221

Kelch's response to the lack of a clear set of guidelines for all the possible
factual situations and to the conflicts of interest that many such situations
may contain, is a rule in which the debtor in possession has no fiduciary
duties. 222 Thus, Kelch proposes an adversarial model. The debtor in possession
would still have a duty of care with respect to the estate property, but would
not have any duty of loyalty to any of the various competing groups. 223 The
management of the debtor could pursue whatever course of action it thought to be
in its own best interest, and any party opposed to such action could resist it
by seeking relief from the bankruptcy court. Rather than relying on fiduciary
duties to control the debtor in possession, such parties would rely solely on
the controls in the Code. The debtor in possession often needs court approval
for many of its actions, such as use, sale, or lease of estate property; use of
cash collateral; post-petition financing; assumption or rejection of executory
contracts; and determination of claims. 224
In order for a chapter 11 plan of reorganization to be consummated, court
approval is required both with respect to the disclosure statement about the
plan and confirmation of the plan. Confirmation also requires the votes of
sufficient creditors and equity holders. 225 Finally, any party in interest can
seek to have the debtor in possession displaced and a trustee appointed. 226 Any
party seeking to influence the behavior of the debtor in possession would rely
on such controls, rather than on a combination of such controls and fiduciary
duties. Indeed, in Kelch's view, such controls are so comprehensive as to make a
debtor in possession's fiduciary duties superfluous. 227 The benefit gained from
removing the fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession is a simplification of
the process. In fact, because
[*509] it is not clear what the fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession
are in all situations, since the debtor in possession often has conflicting
interests in trying to serve the competing parties, and because the Code has so
many controls on the debtor in possession, Kelch reasons that the best approach
is to let the debtor in possession do as it wants and leave it up to the other
parties to oppose its actions if they so choose. 228
Kelch is correct that existing case law has not fully spelled out what the
debtor in possession's duty would require in all situations and that there are
conflicts between various interests at stake. 229 The benefits of his proposed
solution, however, are likely to be less than anticipated. Kelch relies heavily
on a split between the debtor and the debtor in possession, implicitly following
the new person view, a split likely to prove illusory. Kelch recognizes that
Bildisco has raised questions regarding the new entity theory's viability. 230
Thus he posits a variation of the new person view that recognizes a distinction
between the debtor and debtor in possession, not as two separate entities, but
as two roles performed by the same entity. 231 He terms this "coexistence" and
compares it to the distinction between the individual and trustee capacities of
a common law trustee. 232 Accordingly, in its role as debtor in possession, the
debtor would have the various rights and obligations of a trustee granted to a
debtor in possession by the Code. The debtor in possession would retain as the
debtor those rights and obligations granted by the Code to the debtor, such as
the protection of the automatic stay, the obligation to file schedules listing
property and creditors, and the right to propose the plan of reorganization, a
right which is exclusive for at least the first 120 days of the bankruptcy. 233
Differentiation between the roles of the debtor and the debtor in possession
would not permit the debtor in possession to operate free of fiduciary duties.
Although some rights and duties belong to the debtor and others are acquired
through the rights and duties of a trustee, there is an inevitable interplay
between the two sets of tasks. If estate property is subject to security

interests, different parties in interest might prefer different courses of
action. The senior secured creditor might prefer to see the stay lifted so it
can foreclose and sell immediately to use the proceeds to pay her claim. If the
proceeds from foreclosure would not be enough to
[*510] satisfy other claims as well, the other various creditors might prefer
the debtor in possession to retain the property but offer it for sale only at a
higher price. Unsecured creditors and shareholders might contend the property is
necessary for a reorganization and should be used by the debtor in possession
during the interim. Even these two groups could differ as to who should share in
the reorganization. The unsecured creditors might favor a plan of reorganization
that would grant them all the stock of the reorganized entity in return for
their claims and give nothing to the shareholders. Such a plan could be
confirmed if it were "crammed down" over the objections of the shareholders. 234
Thus, management of the debtor would have to choose whether to use its power as
debtor in possession 235 or as the debtor. 236 It would not simplify matters to
say that the debtor in possession has no fiduciary duties. If that were so and
the debtor were free to act in a self-interested manner, only the form of the
question would change, the substance would remain the same: what constraints are
now imposed on management of the debtor?
The distinction between the debtor and the debtor in possession may be made as
neatly as that between an individual and the individual acting as trustee in
another person's bankruptcy. If an individual is appointed trustee, that
individual not only has separate legal roles as individual and as trustee, but
the individual also has her own separate existence. The individual's own
property is separate from the estate, although the individual will receive some
compensation for acting as trustee. The trustee's duty of loyalty rarely becomes
an issue because it is clear. For example, if the trustee used the funds of the
estate to lend money to a venture run by the trustee individually, that would
obviously be improper. But, in essence, that is frequently what will be at issue
with the debtor in possession, because the future prospects of the debtor are
inextricably linked with the future of the estate.
Allowing other parties to seek court protection when they disagree with a course
of action is also likely to return the focus of analysis to the very body of law
Kelch's proposal seeks to avoid, specifically, case law on fiduciary duties.
Where a party disagrees with a proposed course of action, even in the cases
where the Code requires court approval, the Code does not always set the
standard governing review of the debtor in possession's [*511] application.
237 Kelch's proposal would thus require extensive revisions to the Code in order
to provide such standards. In the interim, courts would likely look to the cases
where such problems have arisen before. Both legislators and courts would then
be returning to the case law on fiduciary duties in bankruptcy. Thus, the very
cases that Kelch's proposal hopes to render irrelevant would be needed to fill
in the holes the proposal creates.
In addition, Kelch's proposal, by regarding the debtor in possession as separate
from the debtor and proposing divestment of its fiduciary duties in bankruptcy,
contradicts once again one of the basic tenets of bankruptcy, that bankruptcy
should not alter the rights and obligations of the various parties
unnecessarily. In practical terms, to the extent his proposal actually altered
the fiduciary duties where the debtor remains in possession, then it would grant
an advantage to management in the negotiation of nonbankruptcy workouts. Suppose
Acme Corporation's debts exceed its assets, but Acme has not filed bankruptcy.
Acme is involved in negotiations with its creditors to see if the various
parties can reach a workout agreement, rescheduling or otherwise adjusting
Acme's debt in order to avoid bankruptcy. Suppose also that, because Acme is

insolvent, relevant state law imposes fiduciary duties in favor of its
creditors. If Kelch's proposal were adopted, Acme would have no fiduciary duties
as debtor in possession if it filed bankruptcy. The proposal would not just
change the rules for bankruptcy, but effectively alter the balance outside of
bankruptcy, by giving one party an option to terminate another's rights by
filing for bankruptcy.
In short, Kelch's proposal, while certainly intrepid, reflects the problems with
the new person view in general. It relies on a distinction between the debtor
and the estate in order to solve problems about the debtor, problems that
require specific attention. Kelch's proposal would raise the stakes in one of
the controversial areas of corporate governance, namely whether the shareholders
can hold an election of directors when the corporation is in bankruptcy. Using
the new person view to regard the debtor as entirely separate from the estate,
the shareholders could simply elect a board of directors that would insert
management amenable to the wishes of shareholders. If the debtor in possession
were subject to no fiduciary duties, this would put considerable power into the
hands of shareholders.
Most courts and commentators addressing the issue have concluded
[*512] that a chapter 11 filing does not suspend the ability of shareholders
to hold elections of directors, but such elections may be blocked by the court
if they endanger the reorganization process. 238 This is consistent with the
property view that sees bankruptcy not as causing any change in the existing
corporate structure but permits such changes to occur during the course of the
proceeding. David Skeel recently proposed that elections of directors should be
permitted in chapter 11 cases, but that voting rights should belong to the
unsecured creditors rather than the shareholders. 239 In this section, I will
argue that he reaches this conclusion by implicitly adopting a drastic version
of the new person view, one that is inconsistent with his main point, that
chapter 11 is consistent with existing corporate law. In one sense, Skeel
implicitly rejects the standard new person view. If the estate were a completely
new person independent of the debtor, then bankruptcy would not intrude at all
on the shareholders' rights to hold elections. Skeel achieves the same result by
leaving the debtor as the same corporate entity but divesting the shareholders
of rights before the time that chapter 11 contemplates the confirmation of a
plan.
Skeel's proposal came as one way of implementing the major point of his article:
the rules governing voting with respect to chapter 11 plans of reorganization
are largely consistent with the principles governing state
[*513] corporate law voting rules. He argues convincingly that the absolute
priority rule and other facets of the reorganization process yield similar
results to what state corporate law would require in the absence of bankruptcy.
240 But I am not convinced by the argument that it therefore follows that
elections of directors during the pendency of a chapter 11 case should, in
effect, be subject to the chapter 11 rules governing the confirmation of a plan.
241
Skeel relies on the economic view that chapter 11, in effect, results in a sale
of the corporation's assets to its creditors. 242 Implicit in his analysis,
however, is the proposition that the sale occurs upon the filing of the chapter
11 petition. As soon as bankruptcy is filed, under this view, the creditors
become the owners and therefore should have the rights of owners, including the
right to vote in elections of directors. Thus, in his view, the rights of the
shareholders, the former owners, to vote on major sales of assets and to elect
boards of directors, are extinguished, and such rights are, in turn, given to

the creditors, the new owners. The effect of this would be that the assets are
now in a legal entity no longer subject to shareholder control except for their
eventual voting rights with respect to the plan of reorganization. Thus, major
changes that could occur only pursuant to a plan would be effected without
meeting the procedural safeguards that chapter 11 imposes as a condition to
divesting the shareholders of their interest. 243
By relying on an analogy to a sale occurring at the beginning of the chapter 11
case, rather than upon confirmation of a chapter 11 plan, Skeel is thus arguing
against large parts of chapter 11 itself. His proposal that shareholders be
divested of voting rights with respect to directorial elections and major asset
sales is really an argument against letting shareholders maintain their rights
during bankruptcy at all. 244 But that is an ill
[*514] fit with Skeel's more general argument, that the chapter 11 voting
rules accord well with state corporate law voting rules. These voting rules in
turn reflect the general principle that bankruptcy should not disturb
preexisting substantive nonbankruptcy rights. Indeed, a leading proponent of the
economic model has stated that the better view is to regard the sale as one that
occurs at the time the plan of reorganization is finally confirmed and to
consider the process of negotiating the formulation of the plan as analogous to
the negotiation of the sale. 245 If Corporation A had an election of directors
during the time it was negotiating to sell all of its assets to Corporation B,
the shareholders of B would hardly have a right to vote. Thus, the immediate
extinction of shareholders' rights would be inconsistent with the chapter 11
process, at least as it is presently constituted. 246
Viewing the estate as a separate legal person from the corporation thus distorts
the analysis of corporate law issues in bankruptcy in a number of ways. It
separates the property of the debtor from corporate powers that may be necessary
to realize the value of the property. Furthermore, it makes the analysis of
fiduciary duties murky, potentially nullifying rights in the corporation that
the reorganization provisions seek to preserve.
[*515]
IV. DOES A NONECONOMIC THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY REQUIRE THE NEW PERSON VIEW?

The theoretical impetus behind my position on the legal nature of the bankruptcy
estate is pragmatic. Rather than attempting to find a fundamental
characterization of the estate's legal nature, a cogent bankruptcy analysis
requires a functional approach that looks to the effects of everyday practice.
The previous sections addressed the doctrinal effects of the new person view,
arguing that it tends to have the effect of bypassing relevant analysis through
oversimplification, misdirection, and unnecessary introduction of extra legal
entities. This section examines the place of the new person view in bankruptcy
law more generally, and considers primarily whether the new person view is
necessary for a noneconomic theory of bankruptcy law. The leading bankruptcy
theory advocates an economic position, that bankruptcy law exists primarily as a
means to make debt collection more economically efficient. 247 A number of
commentators have attacked the economic theory on the soundness of its economic
grounds. 248 I am sympathetic to the view that it is not necessary to attempt to
reduce to a single paradigm all of the goals that we attempt to accomplish
through the bankruptcy laws. 249
[*516]
Donald Korobkin, however, has presented a theory that rivals the economic model
250 and attempts to provide an overall theory of bankruptcy. 251 Korobkin's

formulation relies explicitly on a version of the new person view and criticizes
the economic theory for its limited view of the estate as only property. Here I
examine not the merits of Korobkin's theory generally, but rather his reliance
on the new person view. If the new person view is necessary to a non-economic
theory of bankruptcy, then we must consider whether accepting the doctrinal
disadvantages of the new person view outweigh being bound to an economic
explanation of bankruptcy. In other words, if the property view necessarily
leads to a purely economic view of bankruptcy law, there must be a viable
alternative. In this section, I look at the role the new person view plays in
Korobkin's theory: whether it is necessary to his theory, and even whether it is
helpful to his theory, 252 concluding that the new person view is not necessary
for his theory and indeed undermines it.
The economic model of bankruptcy advances the position that bankruptcy law
pertains primarily to debt-collection and serves as a response to the problem of
an insolvent debtor with more obligations than it has the ability to fulfill.
253 Where the debtor's liabilities exceed its assets, each
[*517] creditor has a strong incentive to take immediate action to fully
recover the debt owed, and let the other, slower creditors go unpaid. A likely
consequence of such creditor behavior is an ensuing race for the debtor's
assets, which will lead to creditors as a whole receiving less than they
otherwise would have if they acted to maximize the assets available. 254 For
example, if the debtor has a business that generates enough income to pay all
creditors most of their claims, it is generally inefficient to allow one
creditor to foreclose on a valuable piece of machinery.
Beyond the problem of decreasing the payments to creditors as a whole, a race
among creditors could also change the entitlements. Although two creditors could
have essentially equal rights against the debtor, one could be paid in full
while the other could go unpaid. Thus, individual action by creditors may
distort both the order in which they are paid as well as reduce the overall
amount of assets available. The possibility of a claims race imposes costs on
creditors to monitor each other's behavior so as not to be left at the starting
gate. Creditors could effectively reduce these monitoring costs through formal
agreements, but because creditors are so diverse and change over time,
bargaining costs would probably outweigh monitoring costs. Thus, the creditors
are subject to what economists call a "prisoner's dilemma" or more specifically
a "common pool" problem. 255
The economic view posits bankruptcy law as a response to this problem. It views
bankruptcy law as the bargain that creditors, if they could bargain costlessly,
would reach in order to avoid the aforementioned costs and maximize their
expected return. Bankruptcy law replaces individual actions with a collective
action. A collective action proceeding seeks to maximize the amount available to
creditors and distributes the amount according to the creditors' pre-existing
nonbankruptcy rights. Thus, the creditors' bargain is an economic explanation
and justification of bankruptcy law.
The economic perspective lends itself to a view of bankruptcy analysis more
congenial to the property view than the new person view. When implementing a
hypothetical creditors' bargain according to the economic
[*518] view, the rights and obligations of the creditors and the debtor should
resemble as closely as possible the way those rights and obligations would have
been resolved under nonbankruptcy law, except without the litigation and
accompanying depletion of the debtor's assets. 256 Thus, in analyzing the method
in which issues should be resolved in bankruptcy, the common test is to
determine how the analogous issue would have been decided outside of bankruptcy.
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In contrast, the new person view is generally not used to decide how the issue
would have been decided outside of bankruptcy. Rather, the new person view is
used to eliminate existing nonbankruptcy rights and obligations. For example,
the new person view supports the termination of contract obligations, 258
nullification of corporate powers, 259 and changes in corporate structure 260
upon the commencement of bankruptcy. This is contrary to the basic approach of
the economic model, which seeks to preserve as much as possible the existing
nonbankrutpcy rights and obligations. The property view seeks the same results.
The property view results in fewer changes because it treats the debtor in
possession as simply the debtor corporation in bankruptcy. When analyzing
specific issues, the property view is more likely to require scrutiny of the
relevant nonbankruptcy law because the short cuts of the new person view are not
available. Thus, the property view comports with the economic model better than
the new person approach. If the property view supported only an economic view of
bankruptcy, however, that might justify considering use of another approach.
Korobkin's theory of bankruptcy is an alternative to an economic explanation of
bankruptcy. He attempts to show both that the economic theory does not explain
why bankruptcy law should exist as a distinct body of law and to supply a theory
that does. Korobkin believes that the fundamental flaws of the economic approach
are: treating the corporation simply as a pool of assets to be distributed among
creditors in the most efficient way possible, and ignoring the noneconomic
impact the debtor corporation has on noncreditors. 261 In Korobkin's view, this
results in the economic theory's failure to account for other moral, political,
and social
[*519] values that play a part in bankruptcy. 262 Indeed, a purely economic
view of bankruptcy is hard-pressed to account for the existence of the corporate
reorganization provisions of chapter 11, which have been widely criticized as
economically inefficient. 263 Rather than simply providing a way to divide the
corporation's assets among its creditors, Korobkin believes bankruptcy law
provides a forum in which all those affected by a corporation's financial
distress can express their varied moral, political, and personal grievances. 264
Korobkin relies on the new person view to support his theory. He distinguishes
the economic approach by its treatment of the estate as property and bases his
theory on an alternative perspective: the estate as a new person. 265 Korobkin
believes the economic approach regards the bankruptcy estate simply as being
property because it views the corporation simply as a pool of assets. He states
that such a view might be appropriate if bankruptcy consisted only of
liquidation of assets, analogous to the administration of a decedent's estate.
266 But reorganization, in Korobkin's view, involves more than just economic
decisions about the disposition of assets. In order to include more than simply
economic decisions in the bankruptcy process, Korobkin states that we should
take a broader view of the bankruptcy estate, a view that relies on the new
person approach. He explained, "The focus of this ongoing debate is the
bankruptcy estate, a legal entity removed from the historic business in
distress. The estate should be seen not merely as a pool of assets; instead the
estate should be viewed as an evolving and dynamic enterprise, capable of having
diverse aims." 267 Korobkin implements his perspective by adopting and viewing
the estate as the successor to the debtor corporation. 268
Korobkin relies on a view of the estate as a person rather than property because
in his view, property alone does not have dynamic potential
[*520] but a legal person does:

Dealing with personality involves an entirely different kind of problem from
dealing with property. Quite simply, property is an object. It can be acted
upon; it does not act back. It can be gathered, sold, and distributed. In
contrast, a person is an agent. A person is capable of making choices and
changing. 269

Due to the broad definition of the property that comprises the estate, however,
Korobkin's reliance on the new person view is unnecessary. It is not necessary
for the bankruptcy estate to be treated as a legal person to have dynamic
potential. Korobkin's view of property, which sees it only as objects, incapable
of change or of affecting people in noneconomic ways, is too narrow. The
property of a debtor is much more diverse and dynamic than the physical objects
that the debtor owns at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed. The Code is
written broadly and all the debtor's property rights are included in the estate:
rights in physical objects, contract rights, patents, governmental licenses,
partnership interests, etc. 270
The problem arises when one identifies the legal concept too closely with the
social or economic concept of the enterprise. As Korobkin explained, "Unlike
mere property, a corporation has potential as an enterprise: it can continue to
evolve and even change its personality." 271 The enterprise, however, does not
have to be identified with the corporation. For example, an individual might
conduct business as a sole proprietor and not as a corporation. The individual's
enterprise might include only property interests. These interests, however,
could have dynamic potential for her and others with an interest in the
property. Similarly, property rights in executory contracts, a key property
right in bankruptcy cases, have dynamic potential. Contracts do not simply
represent exchanges of goods. Rather, they can represent the legal aspect of
continuing and evolving relationships. 272
Various legal arrangements may be utilized by the individual that support the
Korobkin vision. These arrangements may be legal persons, such as corporations
and partnerships, or they may be property interests,
[*521] such as contracts and joint tenancies. Indeed, the Uniform Commercial
Code includes in its definition of organization, "two or more persons having a
joint or common interest," 273 and defines person as including "an individual or
an organization." 274 Similarly, tax jurisprudence recognizes that what in form
may be joint ownership of property may be equivalent in function to a
partnership - a legal person. 275 Rather, partnership income tax laws indicate
that no dichotomy exists between legal persons having dynamic potential and
property being inert. 276 In sum, a view of the estate as a person is not
necessary for it to have dynamic potential. The legal concepts that we call
property can have dynamic potential just as the legal concepts that we call
persons.
The dynamic potential of the estate could actually be decreased by the doctrinal
effects of the new person view. For example, by separating the property of the
debtor from the debtor's corporate powers, the new person view creates obstacles
to making the fullest use of the property. Moreover, by creating a new person
and transferring the debtor's property to it, the new person view risks cutting
off persons with interests in the estate, such as contract partners and
shareholders. Indeed, the goal of maintaining the dynamic potential of the
enterprise may be best met simply by leaving the enterprise as a single intact

entity, rather than two artificially separated entities. In any event, the new
person view is clearly not necessary for maintaining the dynamic potential of
the estate.
Another objection to using the new person view as a basis for Korobkin's theory
is that it restricts the breadth of his theory as a justification for
bankruptcy. Using the new person view, the theory applies only to
reorganizations of corporations and not to corporate liquidations or to any
individual bankruptcies. 277 Korobkin states that the estate would be viewed
simply as property to be disposed if bankruptcy were only a liquidation process.
278 Korobkin also limits his discussion to corporate reorganizations, omitting
all individual bankruptcies. 279 These limitations would be unnecessary if the
estate is viewed as property. Accordingly, the scope of his theory could then
extend to all bankruptcies. Moreover, reliance on
[*522] the concept of the estate as a new legal person would limit the effect
of bankruptcy to when a bankruptcy has actually been filed. The reach of
bankruptcy law, however, goes well beyond actual bankruptcy. 280 Whether the
possibility of one party's bankruptcy is remote, as where one party takes a
security interest, or close, as where parties engage in negotiation and reach
workouts outside bankruptcy, bankruptcy law enters into the decisions of all
parties affected. 281 Indeed, in a "prepackaged" bankruptcy, the entire process
of negotiation, the voicing and resolution of the various competing visions of
the enterprise's future, can take place before the petition is even filed. 282
In fact, by limiting the scope to corporate reorganizations, Korobkin's theory
exposes itself to one of his major objections of the economic view. Korobkin
faults the economic view because it does not address large parts of bankruptcy
law, specifically the discharge provisions and "fresh start" policy. 283 But a
theory of bankruptcy that turns only on corporate reorganizations is also
incomplete. If, assuming Korobkin's theory applies only to corporate
reorganization, and the economic view justified bankruptcy in general but
included reservations about whether we should abolish the corporate
reorganization provision, then the two theories would be consistent. They would
be theories of separate bodies of law, indeed complementary theories of two
areas of bankruptcy law. But Korobkin's theory is specifically intended as an
alternative theory to the economic view, and should thus be positioned to
displace it.
Korobkin's approach could reach beyond corporate reorganizations in that the
concerns in his analysis appear in corporate liquidations and in individual
bankruptcies. When a trustee is charged with the liquidation of a bankruptcy
estate, the Code imposes a number of procedural requirements upon the trustee to
ensure individuals have the opportunity to present their view of what should be
done with the bankruptcy estate. 284 The
[*523] trustee cannot assume executory contracts, sell property of the estate
other than in the ordinary course of business, abandon property of the estate,
or hire professionals without court approval. 285 Because these requirements
exist, interested parties are able to voice their opinion of the best course of
action. If a theory of the estate is needed for a theory of bankruptcy law in
its entirety, it would have to be one that is consistent with more than just
chapter 11. By using the property approach, Korobkin's theory could be so
extended.

V. CONCLUSION

The property view, in the final analysis, consistently shows two important
advantages over the new person view, both of which turn on the fact that the
property view results in the legal person of the debtor being more integrated
into the bankruptcy process. First, even though the main reason for the new
person view was an attempt to simplify bankruptcy analysis, on close analysis,
the new person view actually increases complications by postponing them and
often multiplying them. For example, while it offers to simplify the analysis of
executory contracts by saying that the estate is a stranger to the debtor's
contracts, this raises more questions: whether the debtor is still a party; if
so, what are the consequences for both the debtor and the other party to the
contract; and whether a debtor that remains in possession may assume or reject a
"personal" contract.
The new person view also attempts to remove the estate from entanglement with
issues of the debtor's corporate powers and corporate governance by categorizing
the estate as a separate legal entity not concerned by the debtor's internal
corporate issues. But, unless bankruptcy law is radically changed, the
liquidation or reorganization of the debtor's property cannot proceed in
isolation from the debtor. Exercise of the debtor's corporate powers, such as
executing documents or waiving the attorney client privilege, may be necessary
to realize the value of the property of the estate. If no trustee is appointed,
the governance and fiduciary duties of the debtor in possession are inextricably
involved in the bankruptcy. Even if a trustee is appointed, the trustee may need
to control some powers in order to administer the estate. Treating the debtor as
completely separate from the estate introduces a number of distortions in the
rights and obligations of all the parties involved. The property view avoids
these
[*524] distortions by avoiding the unnecessary division of the debtor from its
property.
The second key advantage of the property view is its focus of the analysis on
the relevant rules rather than preempting them with an argument-ending
bankruptcy rule. Bankruptcy should change the existing rights and obligations of
interested parties only where procedurally necessary. The new person view tends
to radically change rights and obligations from the onset of the bankruptcy.
This would mechanically terminate contractual and other rights, and nullify
corporate powers. By contrast, the property view forces us to examine the
particular rights and obligations at issue and determine whether that specific
area of bankruptcy law requires modification of the existing rights and
obligations. Thus, it makes the analysis of particular issues depend not on how
they happen to come out if the estate is considered a new legal person, but
rather on the implementation of the particular policies at issue. 286
Accepting the doctrinal difficulties raised by the new person view might be
necessary if the statutory framework required the new person view or if the
property view excluded any theory of bankruptcy other than an economic approach,
but neither condition holds. The relevant provisions of the bankruptcy statutes
and the tax statutes relevant to bankruptcy cases both favor the property view
over the new person view. The property view is also amenable to both an economic
theory of bankruptcy and a noneconomic one. Where the new person view thus
proves to be unhelpful and unnecessary, bankruptcy law is better served by the
property view.
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bankruptcy as dealing with too many issues to reduce to a single theory).
n250 Other scholars have criticized the economic model, but Korobkin has done
the most toward developing an alternative to the economic model. See John D.
Ayer, So Near to Cleveland, So Far From God: An Essay on the Ethnography of
Bankruptcy, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 440-43 (1992) (discussing Korobkin's place
in recent work in bankruptcy legal theory).
n251 Korobkin, supra note 248. Korobkin has further developed the theory of
bankruptcy described in Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, supra note 33, arguing that
a contractarian theory of bankruptcy would lead to a "principle of rational
planning," the attempt to promote the greatest part of the most important aims
of those affected by the debtor's financial distress. See Korobkin, supra note
248, at 581. He appears to continue to rely on the new person approach. Id. at
546.
n252 Barry Adler has also proposed a theory of bankruptcy as an alternative to
the economic theory. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993). Adler argues that
the present form of bankruptcy law represents not just an attempt at economic
efficiency, but also an adaptation to the political strength of many of the
groups that benefit from an inefficient bankruptcy process, such as lawyers,
corporate managers, and politicians. He suggests that without bankruptcy law,
debtors and creditors could reach optimal agreements that would lead to the most
efficient settlement of claims. Id. at 311-13. Because Adler focuses on the
financial and political aspects of bankruptcy, rather than its legal forms, his
theory does not address the legal nature of the bankruptcy estate.
n253 For the most complete statement of the economic theory, see JACKSON, supra
note 245 (setting out the theory and using it to analyze and criticize existing

bankruptcy law). Although the economic theory has been revised a bit to take
into account both the criticisms of the theory and bankruptcy case law, the
relevant central idea described in the text remains. See Carlson, Bankruptcy
Theory, supra note 248 (arguing that Jackson and Scott's changes in the economic
theory fail to remedy the shortcomings of the theory).
n254 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 247, at 99-102.
n255 JACKSON, supra note 245, at 10 n.9.
n256 Id. at 21-67.
n257 Id. at 99-101, 112-13, 117, 156.
n258 See supra Part II.
n259 See supra Part III.
n260 See supra Part III.
n261 Korobkin, supra note 33, at 768.
n262 Id. at 745.
n263 See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 127, 136-45 (1986) (expressing skepticism about whether chapter 11
is justifiable on economic grounds). Arguments that chapter 11 is economically
inefficient and should be abolished or radically changed have been discussed
both in leading law journals and daily newspapers. See, e.g., Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L. REV. 1043
(1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992); Peter Passell, Critics of Bankruptcy Law
See Inefficiency and Waste, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 12, 1993, at A1, D10. See
also Skeel, supra note 246.
n264 See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 721.
n265 Id. at 721-22.
n266 Id. at 745.
n267 Id. at 721-22.
n268 Id. at 769.
n269 Id. at 744-45.
n270 11 U.S.C. section 541 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
n271 Korobkin, supra note 33, at 768.
n272 See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47
S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
n273 U.C.C. section 1-201(28) (1977).

n274 U.C.C. section 1-201(30) (1977).
n275 For a discussion on how persons who own property together may be considered
partners under the tax laws, see ALAN GUNN, PARTNERSHIP INCOME TAXATION, 139-141
(1991).
n276 Korobkin, supra note 33, at 721-22.
n277 Id. at 768.
n278 Id.
n279 Id. at 739-55.
n280 Korobkin posits bankruptcy as a way to give a voice to those who have an
interest in a corporation that is in financial distress. Id. at 746-47.
n281 Korobkin discusses in his analysis that many corporations in financial
distress do not file for bankruptcy. They may be liquidated under state law or
go through an out of court workout, but the possibility of bankruptcy influences
the decisions of the parties. Id.
A notable recent proposal would extend the bankruptcy mechanism of shareholder
committees to corporate governance generally. See John H. Matheson & Brent A.
Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance,
76 MINN. L. REV. 1313 (1992).
n282 See Mark S. Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The Development
Tool of the "90s in the Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 643,
645 (1991).
n283 Korobkin, supra note 33, at 724.
n284 11 U.S.C. sectionsection 705, 727 (1988).
n285 11 U.S.C. section 365 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); sectionsection 262, 554, 327
(1988).
n286 Thus, the property view looks to the purposes and effects of specific rules
rather than to a formalistic rule devised to preclude more sophisticated legal
analysis and force legal conclusions. The new person view has defects similar to
another phantasmagoric bankruptcy theory, the two transfer theory. The two
transfer theory appears to be on the wane after its rejection by the Seventh
Circuit in the notable Deprizio decision. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Finan.
Corp., (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); accord
In re C-L Cartage Co., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990). The bankruptcy court in
Deprizio used this analysis to hold that where there was a payment on a debt
that had been guaranteed, the transfer of the money was really two transfers:
the first being money from the debtor to the lender, and a separate transfer of
money "for the benefit" of the guarantor. In re Deprizio Constr. Co., 58 B.R.
478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd, 86 B.R. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part
& rev'd in part, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Finan. Corp. (In re Deprizio Constr.
Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). This may or may not have led to a good
conclusion, but it relies on a questionable doctrine. The two transfer theory at
least had limited application. The new person view, on the other hand, performs
similar feats on a larger scale. Avoiding tricks like the two transfer theory
rule and the new person view will require bankruptcy analysis to be more frank

about its pragmatic nature.
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